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Abstract
Machine learning relies on the availability of a vast
amount of data for training. However, in reality, most
data are scattered across different organizations and
cannot be easily integrated under many legal and prac-
tical constraints. In this paper, we introduce a new
technique and framework, known as federated transfer
learning (FTL), to improve statistical models under a
data federation. The federation allows knowledge to be
shared without compromising user privacy, and enables
complimentary knowledge to be transferred in the net-
work. As a result, a target-domain party can build more
flexible and powerful models by leveraging rich labels
from a source-domain party. A secure transfer cross val-
idation approach is also proposed to guard the FTL per-
formance under the federation. The framework requires
minimal modifications to the existing model structure
and provides the same level of accuracy as the non-
privacy-preserving approach. This framework is very
flexible and can be effectively adapted to various secure
multi-party machine learning tasks.
Introduction
Recent Artificial Intelligence (AI) achievements have been
depending on the availability of massive amount of labeled
data. AlphaGo (Silver et al. 2016) uses 30 millions of
moves from 160,000 actual games.The ImageNet dataset
(Deng et al. 2009) has over 14 million images. However,
across various industries, more fields of application have
only small or poor quality data. Labeling data is very expen-
sive, especially in fields which require human expertise and
domain knowledge. In addition, data needed for a specific
task may not be kept in one place. Many organizations may
only have unlabeled data, and some other organizations may
have very limited amount of labels. It has been increasingly
difficult for organizations to combine their data too. For
example, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
(EU 2016), a new bill introduced by the European Union,
has enforced many terms that protect the privacy of the
user security and prohibit organizations to exchange data
directly. How to enable the large number of businesses and
applications that have only small data (few samples and
features) or weak supervision (few labels) to build effective
and accurate AI models while meeting the data privacy,
security and regulatory requirements is a major challenge.
To overcome these challenges, Google first introduced a
federated learning (FL) system (McMahan et al. 2016) in
which a global machine learning model is updated by a
federation of distributed participants while keeping their
data locally. Their framework require all contributors
share the same feature space. On the other hand, secure
machine learning with data partitioned in the feature space
has been studied (Karr et al. 2004; Sanil et al. 2004;
Gasco´n et al. 2016; Du, Han, and Chen 2004;
Wan et al. 2007; Hardy et al. 2017; Nock et al. 2018).
These existing approaches are only applicable to either
common features or common samples under a federation.
In reality, however, the set of common entities could be
small, making a federation less attractive and leaving the
majority non-overlapping data undermined. In this paper,
we propose a possible solution to these challenges: Fed-
erated Transfer Learning (FTL), which leverages transfer
learning technique (Pan et al. 2010) to provide solutions for
the entire sample and feature space under a federation. Our
main contributions are the following:
- We introduce federated transfer learning in a privacy-
preserving setting to provide solutions for federation
problems beyond the scope of existing federated learning
approaches;
- We provide an end-to-end solution to the proposed
FTL problem and show that convergence and accuracy of
the proposed approach is comparable to the non-privacy-
preserving approach;
- We provide a novel approach for adopting additively
homomorphic encryption (HE) to multi-party computation
(MPC) with neural networks such that only minimal modi-
fications to the neural network is required and the accuracy
is almost lossless, whereas most of the existing secure deep
learning frameworks suffer from loss of accuracy when
adopting privacy-preserving techniques.
Related Work
Federated Learning and Secure Deep Learning
Recent several years have seen a surge of studies on
encrypted machine learning. For example, Google in-
troduced a secure aggregation scheme to protect the
privacy of aggregated user updates under their feder-
arted learning framework (Bonawitz et al. 2017). Cryp-
toNets (Dowlin et al. 2016) adapted neural network com-
putations to work with data encrypted with Homomorphic
Encryption (Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos 1978). Cryp-
toDL (McMahan et al. 2016) approximates the activation
functions in neural networks with low degree polynomi-
als to achieve less precision loss in prediction. DeepSecure
(Rouhani, Riazi, and Koushanfar 2017) uses Yao’s Garbled
Circuit Protocol for data encryption instead of HE. All of
these frameworks are designed for making encrypted pre-
dictions with a server-end model, therefore are applicable
for inference only. SecureML (Mohassel and Zhang 2017)
is a multi-party computing scheme which uses secret-
sharing (Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman 1979) and Yao’s Gar-
bled Circuit for encryption and supports collabora-
tive training for linear regression, logistic regression
and neural networks, which is recently extended by
(Mohassel and Rindal 2018) with three-party computation.
Differential Privacy (Dwork 2008) is another thread of
works for privacy-preserving training. It has the weakness
that raw data is possibly exposed and could not make infer-
ence on a single entity.
Transfer Learning
Transfer learning is a powerful technique to provide so-
lutions for applications with small dataset or weak su-
pervision. In recent years there have been tremendous
amount of research work on adopting transfer learning tech-
niques to various fields such as image classification tasks
(Zhu et al. 2010), and sentiment analysis (Pan et al. 2010;
Li et al. 2017). The performance of transfer learning relies
on how related the domains are. Intuitively parties in the
same data federation are usually organizations from the
same or related industry, therefore are more prone to knowl-
edge propagation.
Problem Definition
Consider a source domain dataset DA := {(x
A
i , y
A
i )}
NA
i=1
where xAi ∈ R
a and yAi ∈ {+1,−1} is the i th label, a tar-
get domain DB := {x
B
j }
NB
j=1 where x
B
j ∈ R
a. DA, DB are
separately held in two private parties and can not be exposed
to each other. We also assume that there exists a limited set
of co-occurrence samples DAB := {(x
A
i , x
B
i )}
NAB
i=1 and a
small set of labels for B in party A: Dc := {(x
B
i , y
A
i )}
Nc
i=1,
where Nc is the number of available target labels. Without
losing generality, we assume all labels are in party A, but all
the deduction here can be adapted to the case where labels
exist in party B. One can find the commonly shared sam-
ple ID set in a privacy-preserving setting by masking data
IDs with encryption techniques such as RSA scheme. Here
we assume that A and B already found or both know their
commonly shared sample IDs. Given the above setting, the
objective is for the two parities to build a transfer learning
model to predict labels for the target-domain party as accu-
rately as possible without exposing data to each other.
Security Definition
In our security definition, all parties are honest-but-curious.
We assume a threat model with a semi-honest adversary
D who can corrupt at most one of the two data clients.
The security definition is that, for a protocol P performing
(OA, OB) = P (IA, IB), whereOA andOB are party A and
B’s output and IA and IB are their inputs, P is secure against
A if there exists infinite number of (I ′B , O
′
B) pairs such that
(OA, O
′
B) = P (IA, I
′
B). Such a security definition has been
adopted in (Du, Han, and Chen 2004). It provides a practi-
cal solution to control information disclosure as compared
to complete zero knowledge security.
Proposed Approach
In this section, we will first introduce the transfer learn-
ing model, and then propose a federated framework. In re-
cent years, deep neural networks have been widely adopted
in transfer learning to find implicit transfer mechanism
(Oquab et al. 2014). Here we explore a general scenario
where hidden representations of A and B, are produced
from two neural networks uAi = Net
A(xAi ) and u
B
i =
NetB (xBi ), where u
A ∈ RNA×d and uB ∈ RNB×d, d
is the dimension of the hidden representation layer. To la-
bel the target domain, a general approach is to introduce a
prediction function ϕ(uBj ) = ϕ(u
A
1 , y
A
1 ...u
A
NA
, yANA , u
B
j ).
Without losing much generosity, we assume ϕ(uBj ) is lin-
early separable, that is ϕ(uBj ) = Φ
AG(uBj ). For exam-
ple, (Shu et al. 2015) used a translator function, ϕ(uBj ) =
1
NA
∑NA
i y
A
i u
A
i (u
B
j )
′, where ΦA = 1
NA
∑NA
i y
A
i u
A
i and
G(uBj ) = (u
B
j )
′ We can then write the training objective
function using the available labeled set:
argminL1
ΘA,ΘB
=
Nc∑
i
ℓ1(y
A
i , ϕ(u
B
i )) (1)
where ΘA, ΘB are training parameters of NetA and
NetB , respectively. Let LA and LB be the number of lay-
ers for NetA and NetB , respectively, then ΘA = {θAl }
LA
l=1,
ΘB = {θBl }
LB
l=1 where θ
A
l and θ
B
l are the training parame-
ters for the lth layer. ℓ1 denotes the loss function. For logistic
loss, ℓ1(y, ϕ) = log(1 + exp(−yϕ)).
In addition, we also wish to minimize the alignment loss
between A and B.
argminL2
ΘA,ΘB
= −
NAB∑
i
ℓ2(u
A
i , u
B
i ) (2)
where ℓ2 denotes the alignment loss. Typical alignment
losses can be −uAi (u
B
i )
′ or ||uAi − u
B
i ||
2
F . For simplicity,
we assume it can be expressed in the form ℓ2(u
A
i , u
B
i ) =
ℓA2 (u
A
i ) + ℓ
B
2 (u
B
i ) + κu
A
i (u
B
i )
′, where κ is a constant.
The final objective function is:
argminL
θA,θB
= L1 + γL2 +
λ
2
(LA3 + L
B
3 ) (3)
where γ and λ are the weight parameters, and LA3 =∑LA
l ||θ
A
l ||
2
F , L
B
3 =
∑LB
l ||θ
B
l ||
2
F are the regularization
terms.
Now we focus on obtaining the gradients for updating
ΘA, ΘB in back propagation. For i ∈ {A,B}, we have
∂L
∂θil
=
∂L1
∂θil
+ γ
∂L2
∂θil
+ λθil (4)
Under the assumption that A and B are not allowed to
expose their raw data, a privacy-preserving approach needs
to be developed here to compute (3) and (4).
Additively Homomorphic Encryption
Additively Homomorphic Encryption (Acar et al. 2018) and
polynomial approximations have been widely used for
privacy-preserving machine learning, and the trade-offs be-
tween efficiency and privacy by adopting such approxi-
mations have been discussed intensively (Aono et al. 2016;
Kim et al. 2018; Phong et al. 2017). Here we use a second
order Taylor approximation for loss and gradients computa-
tions:
ℓ1(y, ϕ) ≈ ℓ1(y, 0) +
1
2
C(y)ϕ+
1
8
D(y)ϕ2 (5)
where C(y) = ∂ℓ1
∂ϕ
|ϕ=0,D(y) =
∂2ℓ1
∂ϕ2
|ϕ=0
∂ℓ
∂ϕ
=
1
2
C(y) +
1
4
D(y)ϕ (6)
For logistic loss, C(y) = y, D(y) = y2. Applying equa-
tion (5) and (6), and additively homomorphic encryption,
denoted as [[·]], we can finally obtain:
[[L]] =
Nc∑
i
([[ℓ1(y
A
i , 0)]] +
1
2
C(yAi )Φ
A[[G(uBi )]]
+
1
8
D(yAi )Φ
A[[(G(uBi ))
′G(uBi )]](Φ
A)′)
+ γ
NAB∑
i
([[ℓB2 (u
B
i )]] + [[ℓ
A
2 (u
A
i )]] + κu
A
i [[(u
B
i )
′]])
+ [[
λ
2
LA3 ]] + [[
λ
2
LB3 ]]
(7)
[[
∂L
∂θBl
]] =
Nc∑
i
∂(G(uBi ))
′G(uBi )
∂uBi
[[(
1
8
D(yAi )(Φ
A)′ΦA]]
∂uBi
∂θBl
+
Nc∑
i
[[
1
2
C(yAi )Φ
A]]
∂G(uBi )
∂uBi
∂uBi
∂θBl
+
NAB∑
i
([[γκuAi ]]
∂uBi
∂θBl
+ [[γ
∂ℓB2 (u
B
i )
∂θBl
]]) + [[λθBl ]]
(8)
[[
∂L
∂θAl
]] =
NA∑
j
Nc∑
i
(
1
4
D(yAi )Φ
A[[G(uBi )
′G(uBi )]]
+
1
2
C(yAi )[[G(u
B
i )]])
∂ΦA
∂uAj
∂uAj
∂θAl
+ γ
NAB∑
i
([[κuBi ]]
∂uAi
∂θAl
+ [[
∂ℓA2 (u
A
i )
∂θAl
]]) + [[λθAl ]]
(9)
Algorithm 1: Federated Transfer Learning: Training
Input: learning rate η, weight parameter γ, λ, max
iterationsm, tolerance t
Output:Model parametersΘA, ΘB
A, B initializes ΘA, ΘB and creates an encryption key
pair, respectively, and sends public key to each other.
iter = 0; while iter ≤ m do
A do:
uAi ←− Net
A(ΘA, xAi ) for i ∈ DA;
computes and encrypts {hAk (u
A
i , y
A
i )}k=1 ,2 ...KA
and sends to B;
B do:
uBi ←− Net
B(ΘB , xBi ) for i ∈ DB ;
computes and encrypts {hBk (u
B
i )}k=1 ,2 ...KB , and
send to A;
A do:
creates random maskmA;
computes [[ ∂L
∂θA
l
+mA]]B and [[L]]B by equation
(7) and (9) and sends to B;
B do:
create random maskmB;
computes [[ ∂L
∂θB
l
+mB]]A by equation (8) and
sends to A;
B do:
decrypts ∂L
∂θA
l
+mA,L and sends to A;
A do:
decrypts ∂L
∂θB
l
+mB and sends to B;
B do:
update θBl = θ
B
l − η
∂L
∂θB
l
;
A do:
update θAl = θ
A
l − η
∂L
∂θA
l
;
if Lprev − L ≤ t then
send stop signal to B;
break;
else
Lprev = L;
iter = iter + 1;
continue;
end
end
Algorithm 2: Federated Transfer Learning: Prediction
Input:Model parametersΘA, ΘB , {xBj }j∈NB
Output: {yBj }j∈NB
B do:
uBj ←− Net
B(ΘB , xBj );
encrypts {[[G(uBj )]]}j∈NB and sends to A;
A do:
creates random maskmA;
computes [[ϕ(uBj )]]B = Φ
A[[G(uBj )]]B and sends
[[ϕ(uBj ) +m
A]]B to B;
B do:
decrypts ϕ(uBj ) +m
A and sends to A;
A do:
gets ϕ(uBj ) and y
B
j , sends y
B
j to B.
Federated Transfer Learning
With above equations (7),(8) and (9), we can now design
a federated algorithm for solving the transfer learning
problem. See Algorithm 1. Denote [[·]]A and [[·]]B be
the homomorphic encryption with public key A and B,
respectively. Specifically, party A and party B initial-
ize and run their independent neural networks NetA
and NetB locally to get hidden representations uAi and
uBi , party A then computes and encrypts components
{hk (u
A
i , y
A
i )}k=1 ,2 ...KA and sends to B to assist cal-
culations of gradients of NetB . In the current scenario,
KA = 3 and h
A
1 (u
A
i , y
A
i ) = {[[
1
8
D(yAi )(Φ
A)′(ΦA)]]}Nci=1 ,
hA2 (u
A
i , y
A
i ) = {[[
1
2
C (yAi )Φ
A]]}Nci=1 , and h
A
3 (u
A
i , y
A
i ) =
{[[γκuAi ]]}
NAB
i=1 . Similarly, B then computes and en-
crypts components {hBk (u
B
i )}k=1 ,2 ...KB and sends to
A to assist calculations of gradients of NetA and loss
L. In the current scenario, KB = 4 and h
B
1 (u
B
i ) =
{[[(G(uBi ))
′G(uBi )]]}
Nc
i=1 , h
B
2 (u
B
i ) = {[[G(u
B
i )]]}
Nc
i=1 ,
hB3 (u
B
i ) = {[[κu
B
i ]]}
NAB
i=1 , and h
B
4 (u
B
i ) = [[
λ
2
LB3 ]].
Recently, there are large amount of works discussing
the potential risks associated with this indirect leakage
such as gradients (Hitaj, Ateniese, and Pe´rez-Cruz 2017;
Bonawitz et al. 2017; Shokri and Shmatikov 2015;
McSherry 2016; Phong et al. 2018). To prevent from
knowing A and B’s gradients, A and B further mask each
gradient with an encrypted random value. A and B then
send the encrypted masked gradients and loss to each other
and get decrypted values. A can send termination signals
to B once the loss convergence condition is met. Otherwise
A and B will unmask the gradient, update the weight
parameters with their gradients respectively and move to
next iteration. Once the model is trained, we can provide
predictions for unlabeled data in party B. Specifically for
each unlabeled data, B computes uBj with trained network
parameters ΘB , sends encrypted [[G(uBj )]] to A, and then
A evaluates and masks it with random values and sends
encrypted and masked ϕ(uBj ) to B, B decrypts and sends
back to A, A obtains ϕ(uBj ) and gets the label, and sends
the label to B. Notice the only source of performance
loss over the secure FTL process is second-order Taylor
approximation of the final loss function, rather than at
every non-linear activation layer of the neural network,
such as in (Hesamifard, Takabi, and Ghasemi 2017), and
the computations inside the networks are unaffected. As
demonstrated in the Experiments section, the errors in loss
and gradient calculations, as well as the loss in accuracy by
adopting our approach are minimal. Therefore the approach
is scalable and flexible to the change of neural network
structures.
Algorithm 3: Federated Transfer Learning: Cross Vali-
dation
Input:ModelMF , number of foldsK
Output:model performance VMF ,DF
A do:
split DA intoK shares, D
k
A = {(x
A
i , y
A
i )}i∈Ik ;
Vsum = 0;
for i=1,2...K do
A,B do:
trainMF ,Dk with D
k
A and DB by Algorithm 1;
predict labels DuB for B by Algorithm 2;
B do:
combine predicted labels: DkB = DB
⋃
DuB;
A,B do:
trainMF ,Dk with D
k
A
⋃
DkB by Algorithm 1;
predict labels for party A yAj ∗ by Algorithm 2;
A do:
evaluate VMF ,Dk with {(y
A
j ∗, y
A
j )}i∈Ik ;
Vsum+ = VMF ,Dk
end
VMF ,DF = Vsum/K
Transfer Cross Validation
For model validation, we also propose a secure trans-
fer cross validation approach (TrCV), inspired by
(Zhong et al. 2010). See Algorithm 3. First, we split
the labeled data in the source domain into K folds and
each time reserve one fold data as our test set. We use the
remaining data to build a model by Algorithm 1 and conduct
label predictions by Algorithm 2. Next, we combine the
predicted labels with the original dataset and retrain the
model by Algorithm 1 and evaluate it on the reserved
dataset with:
[[ϕ(uAj )]]j∈Dk
A
= ΦB [[(G(uAj ))
′]] (10)
Decrypting [[ϕ(uAj )]] and comparing with true labels
{yAi }i∈Ik , we obtain the performance of the kth fold :
VMF,Dk . Finally, an optimal model is selected as:
MˆF ,DF = argmax
MF
1
K
K∑
k=1
VMF ,Dk (11)
Notice that TrCV performs validations using source domain
labels, which could be advantageous in situations where tar-
get labels are difficult to obtain. A self-learning supervised
modelMF ,Dc is also built with Dc to provide safeguards
against negative transfer (Kuzborskij and Orabona 2013;
Zhong et al. 2010). In the scenario that the labels are in
the source-domain party, the self-learning is reduced to a
feature-based federated learning problem. Otherwise the
target-domain party will build the self-learning model itself.
In the cases that the transfer learning model is inferior to a
self-learning model, knowledge needs not to be transfered.
Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The protocol in Algorithm 1 and 2 is secure
under our security definition, provided that the underlying
additively homomorphic encryption scheme is secure.
Proof. The training protocol in Algorithm 1 and 2 do not
reveal any information, because all A and B learns are
the masked gradients. Each iteration A and B creates new
random masks thereby the randomness and secrecy of the
masks will guarantee the security of the information against
the other party(Du, Han, and Chen 2004). During training,
party A learns its own gradients at each step, but this is not
enough for A to learn any information from B based on the
inability of solving n equations in more than n unknowns
(Du, Han, and Chen 2004; Vaidya and Clifton 2002). In an-
other word, there exists infinite number of inputs from B
to provide the same gradients to A. Similarly, party B can
not learn any information from A. Therefore, as long as the
encryption scheme is considered secure, the protocol is se-
cure. During evaluation, party A learns the predicted result
for each sample from B, which is a scalar product, from
which A can not learn B’s information. B learns only the
label, from which B can not learn A’s information.
At the end of the training process, each party (A or B)
remains oblivious to the data structure of the other party,
and it obtains the model parameters associated only with
its own features. At inference time, the two parties need
to collaboratively compute the prediction results. Note the
protocol does not deal with a malicious party. If party A
fakes its inputs and submits only one non-zero input, it may
tell the value of uBi at that input’s position. It still can not
tell xBi or ΘB , and neither party will get correct results.
In summary, we provide both data security and perfor-
mance gain in the proposed FTL framework. Data security
is provided because raw dataDA andDB , as well as the local
modelsNetA andNetB are never exposed and only the en-
crypted common hidden representations are exchanged. In
each iteration, the only non-encrypted values party A and
party B receive are the gradients of their model parame-
ters, which is aggregated from all sample variants. Perfor-
mance gain is provided by the combination of transfer learn-
ing, transfer cross validation and a safeguard with the self-
learning supervised model.
Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments on multiple public
data sets: 1) NUS-WIDE data set (seng Chua et al. 2009)
2) Kaggle’s Default-of-Credit-Card-Clients (Kaggle )
(”Default-Credit”) to validate our proposed approach and
study the effectiveness and scalability of the approach
with respect to various key impacting factors,including the
number of overlapping samples, the dimension of hidden
common representations and the number of features. The
NUS-WIDE data set (seng Chua et al. 2009) consists of
hundreds of low-level features from Flickr images as well
as their associate tags and ground truth labels. There are in
total 81 ground truth labels. We use the top 1000 tags as text
features and combine all the low-level features including
color histogram, color correlogram as image features.
Here we consider a data federation between party A and
party B, where A has text tags features and image labels
XA, Y A and B has low-level image features XB , and an
one-vs-all classification problem. For each experiment we
randomly sampled from the negative data set to maintain a
balanced ratio between positive and negative samples. Here
we consider networks of stacked auto-encoders, where for
i ∈ {A,B},
xij,l ←− Se(w
i
lx
i
j,l−1 + b
i
l), j ∈ Ni (12)
where l denotes the lth layer of stacked auto-encoder,uAi =
xAL , and Se(·) denotes the sigmoid activation function. In
our experiments, we train the stacked auto encoders for each
party separately and minimize the encoder loss together with
the supervised federated transfer loss as in Algorithm 1.
”Default-Credit” data set consists of credit card records in-
cluding user’s demographic features, history of payment and
bill statement etc with user’s default payment as labels. After
applying one-hot encoding to categorical features, we obtain
a data set with 33 features and 30,000 samples. We then split
the dataset both in the feature space and the sample space to
simulate a two-party federation problem. We assign all the
labels to party A. We also assign each sample to party A,
party B or both so that there is a small number of sample
overlaps between A and B. We used one-layer SAEs with 32
neurons in this case. We separate the features in a way that
the demographic features are on one side, separated from
the payment and balance features. Such segregation can be
found in industrial scenarios where businesses such as retail
and car rentals leveraging banking data for users’ credibil-
ity predictions and customer segmentation.Many businesses
(Party B) only have user’s demographic data and possibly
limited set of data about user’s financing behavior, whereas
banks usually have reliable labels. However, current collab-
orations with banking data (Party A) are rare due to data
privacy constrains, but federated transfer learning provides
a possibility to bridge data from different industries. In our
experiments, Party A has six months of payment and bill
balance data, whereas Party B has user’s profile data such as
education, marriage,age and sex. We adopted the translator
function as in (Shu et al. 2015), logistic loss function and an
alignment loss −uAi (u
B
i )
′.
Impact of Taylor approximation
We studied the effect of Taylor approximation bymonitoring
and comparing the training loss decay and the performance
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Figure 1: Comparison of learning loss (Left) and weighted-F1 score (Right) for using logistic loss and Taylor approximation in
federated transfer learning with 2-layers and 1-layer neurons respectively.
tasks samplesNc TLT TLL LR SVMs SAEs
water vs other 100 0.692± 0.062 0.691± 0.060 0.685± 0.020 0.640± 0.016 0.677± 0.048
water vs other 200 0.702± 0.010 0.701± 0.007 0.672± 0.023 0.643± 0.038 0.662± 0.010
person vs other 100 0.697± 0.010 0.697± 0.020 0.694± 0.026 0.619± 0.050 0.657± 0.030
person vs other 200 0.733± 0.009 0.735± 0.010 0.720± 0.004 0.706± 0.023 0.707± 0.008
sky vs other 100 0.700± 0.022 0.713± 0.006 0.694± 0.016 0.679± 0.018 0.667± 0.009
sky vs other 200 0.718± 0.033 0.718± 0.024 0.696± 0.026 0.680± 0.042 0.684± 0.056
Table 1: Comparison of weighted F1 score of transfer learning with Taylor loss (TLT), with logistic loss (TLL) and self-learning
with logistic regression (LR), with support vector machines(SVMs), and with stacked auto encoders(SAEs).
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Figure 2: Performance of FTL and LR with respect to the
number of overlapping samples.
4 6 8 10 12 14
k
0.61
0.62
0.63
0.64
0.65
0.66
0.67
0.68
we
ig
ht
ed
 F
1 
sc
or
e
LR
CV
TrCV
Figure 3: Comparison of performance using TrCV, CV and
LR for various number of folds k.
of prediction. Here we test the convergence and precision
of the algorithm using the NUS-WIDE data and neural net-
works with different levels of depth. In the first case NetA
and NetB both have one auto-encoder layer with 64 neu-
rons. In the second case NetA and NetB both have two
auto-encoder layers with 128 and 64 neurons. In both cases,
we used 500 training samples, 1396 overlapping pairs and
γ = 0.05, λ = 0.005. We summarize the results in Figure
(1). We found that loss decays at a similar rate when using
Taylor approximation as compared to using the full logistic
loss, and the weighted F1 score of the Taylor approximation
approach is also comparable to the full logistic approach.
The loss converges to a different minima in both cases, sim-
ilar to (Hardy et al. 2017). As we increased the depth of
the neural networks, the convergence and the performance
of the model do not decay. Most of existing secure deep
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Figure 4: Running time per iteration as a function of dimension of the commonly shared hidden representation d (Left); number
of the features in B (Middle); number of the commonly shared samples (Right).
learning frameworks suffer from accuracy loss when adopt-
ing privacy-preserving techniques. For example, SecureML
(Mohassel and Zhang 2017) reports more than 1% accuracy
loss when training with 2 hidden layers with 128 neurons in
each layer on the MNIST dataset using MPC techniques.
In CryptoDL (Hesamifard, Takabi, and Ghasemi 2017), an
inference-only secure deep learning protocol, it is shown
that using degree-2 Taylor approximation can result in over
50% accuracy loss in a 2-layer convolutional neural net-
work. Using only low-degree Taylor approximation, the
drop in accuracy in our approach is much less than the state-
of-art secure neural networks with similarly approximations,
therefore our approach is very adaptive to deeper neural net-
works.
Transfer learning vs self-learning
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed transfer learning approach by comparing it to the
self-learning approach. We tested both the transfer learn-
ing approaches with Taylor loss (TLT) and with logistic loss
(TLL). For the self-learning approach, we picked three algo-
rithms,logistic regression(LR), SVMs and stacked auto en-
coders(SAEs). The SAEs are of the same structure of the
ones we used for transfer learning, and are connected to a
logistic layer for classification. We picked three of the most
occurring labels in the NUS-WIDE dataset. For each exper-
iment, the number of co-occurrence samples we used is half
of the number of total samples in that category. We varied
the size of the training sample set and conducted three tests
for each experiment with different random partition of the
samples. For each experiment the parameters λ and γ are
optimized by cross validation. The results are summarized in
Table 1. FromTable 1 we show that TLT and TLL yield com-
parable performance across all tests. The proposed trans-
fer learning approach outperforms the baseline self-learning
approaches using only a small set of training samples for
almost all the experiments conducted. In addition, the per-
formance improves as we increased the number of training
samples.The results validate the robustness of the algorithm.
Effect of overlapping samples Figure 2 shows the effect
of varying the number of overlapping samples on the per-
formance of transfer learning. The overlapping sample pairs
are used to bridge the hidden representations between the
two parties, therefore the performance of federated transfer
learning improves as the availability of the overlapping pairs
increase.
Transfer Cross Validation We evaluate the performance
of the transfer cross validation (TrCV) technique by com-
paring to a plain cross validation(CV) approach using the
Default-Credit data set. The experiments are conducted us-
ing dB = 18, 200 training samples and 6000 overlapping
samples, and γ = 0.005, λ = 0.005. The results are shown
in Figure 3. We show that TrCV approach outperforms a CV
approach at various values of k (folds).
Scalability
To evaluate the scalability of the proposed algorithm, we
conduct experiments to simulate three-party computation on
a single Intel i5 machine with 8 GB memory. In these ex-
periments parties communicate with an XML-RPC proto-
col. We use the Paillier additively homomorphic encryption
(Paillier 1999) implemented in python 1. The key size for en-
cryption we adopted is 1024 bits. We study how the running
time scales with the number of overlapping samples and the
number of target-domain features, as well as the dimension
of the domain-invariant hidden representations, denote as d.
From equation (8) and (9) we show that the communication
cost for B sending encrypted information to A is:
CostB−→A = n ∗ (d
2 + d) ∗ ct (13)
where ct denotes the size of one encrypted text, n denotes
the number of samples sent. The same level of communica-
tion cost applies when sending encrypted information from
A to B. For d = 64, ct = 256 bytes, per sample commu-
nication is about 1 MB. We show how the running time
per iteration scales with various key factors in Figure (4).
As expected from the above analysis, as we increase the di-
mension of the hidden representation d, the increase of the
running time is accelerating across different values of num-
ber of overlapping samples tested. On the other hand, the
running time grows linearly with respect to the number of
target-domain features, as well as the number of samples
shared. The communication time is included in the overall
1 https://github.com/n1analytics/python-paillier
runtime reported.With 10 hidden dimensions, the communi-
cation time is roughly 40 percents of the total runtime. Com-
putations of encrypted gradients accounts for about 50 per-
cents of the runtime and the rest is consumed on encryption
and decryption operations. For simulations we use a python-
implementation of XML-RPC protocol with HTTP connec-
tions and localhost server proxy. Efficiency and scalability
is still a challenge, although we haven’t used distributed and
asynchronous computing techniques or high-power GPUs
for efficient improvement, the algorithm proposed here is
parallelable and also friendly with high-performance ma-
chine learning platforms such as tensorflow.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed Federated Transfer Learning
(FTL) framework and expanded the scope of existing se-
cure federated learning to broader real-world applications.
We demonstrated that in contrast to the existing secure deep
learning approaches which usually suffer from accuracy
loss, the proposed secure FTL is as accurate as the non-
privacy-preserving approach and has superior performance
over the non-federated self-learning approach. We also in-
troduced a scalable and flexible approach for adapting ad-
ditively homomorphic encryption to neural networks with
minimal modifications to the existing structure of the neural
networks. The proposed framework is a complete privacy-
preserving solution which includes training, evaluation and
cross validation. The current framework is not limited to any
specific learning models but rather a general framework for
privacy-preserving transfer learning. That said, the current
solution does have limitations. For example, it requires par-
ties to exchange encrypted intermediate results from only
the common representation layers therefore are not applica-
ble to all transfer mechanisms. Future works for FTL may
include exploring and adopting the methodology to other
deep learning systems where privacy-preserving data collab-
oration is needed, and continuing improving the efficiency of
the algorithms by using distributed computing techniques,
and finding less expensive encryption schemes.
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